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What is the FYDP? Why does it matter?
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• Discerning, negotiating, and communicating priorities are necessary tasks for the U.S. 
defense acquisition system to implement its portion of the National Defense Strategy 
effectively. 
• One of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) central tools for doing so is the Future Years 
Defense Plan (FYDP), a projection of the cost and composition of the force over the next 
five years. 
• Annually updated and submitted as part of the President’s Budget (PB), the FYDP, 
especially for investment accounts, provides insights into DoD’s priorities and future 
expectations.
This presentation answers the following questions:
• How reliable are investment FYDP projections as an indicator for actual spending?
• How does reliability compare across base-budget exclusive and Other Contingency 
Operation (OCO)-related budget lines?
• How does projection reliability vary across the Military Departments?
Historical Topline FYDP Estimates
Source: Harrison and Daniels, 2020, pp. 11
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How good is the data quality?
Research Development Testing & Evaluation (RDT&E)
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• We created a dataset drawing 
from the justification books (the 
R-2s and P-40s).
• We cross checked using 
comptroller documents (R-1, P-
1s)
• There were disagreements we 
were not able to resolve, so we 
labeled data based on 
confidence.
• Confusion comes in from 
dozens of lines starting and 
ending each year, some of 
transfers.
• Procurement has more 
disagreements due to advanced 
procurement misalignments.





Budget Request (Available in P-1s, P-
40s, R-1s, and R-2s)










2nd Year of 
FYDP
(PB+1)
3rd Year of 
FYDP
(PB+2)
4th Year of 
FYDP
(PB+3)
5th Year of 
FYDP
(PB+4)
PB18 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022
PB19 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022
PB20 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022
PB21 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024 FY 2025
• The FYDP projects five years forward, starting with the President’s Budget (PB), and looks two 
years back to report actual spending.
• This paper compares cumulative spending, so for example looking at the 2nd year of the FYDP 
would compare two years of projections from PB2018 to actual spending reported across the 
PB2020 and PB 2021 budget. We include OCO in the PB projections.
FYDP Projections strongly correlate with actual spending
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Base versus OCO-related budget lines
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• OCO-related budget 
lines shows wider 
distributions than 
base-only lines.
• The dashed blue line 






Median relative difference between projections and actual 




John Roth and Gen. Anythony R. Ierardi brief reporters on the PB 2018. 
Image Source: Jim Garamone, 2017 May 23. VIRIN: 170523-D-FB314-001
• To examine interaction of multiple 
factors, we created regression 
models of two-year FYDP in the very 
different PB2013 capped and PB2018 
growth environment.
• The reliability of projections was 
dramatically improved by first 
estimated if a budget line would be 
funded and separately estimating 
funded lines with projections of no 
spending.
Does the reliability of projection vary systematically 
between DoD components and between base and OCO lines?
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Image Source: Woodward, F.M. and Arthur, D. (2019 Aug). 
“Long-Term Implications of the 2020 Future Years Defense 
Program.” CBO: 1.
• The Army often has the largest medians, though it 
is only significantly different from Navy in the 
PB2018 Base model. Army OCO spending is more 
prevalent, but less distinct from other services.
• Other DoD was most accurate in the PB2013 2nd
outyear median measure and prove significantly 
different from the Navy in the PB2013 Base model.
• The differences between base and OCO-relevant 
budget lines are more robust, medians are typically 
greater magnitude (negative in PB2013) and OCO 
models are more uncertain.
Conclusions and Recommendations
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• For all the flaws, even the outyear FYDP projections highly correlated with actual 
spending.
• There is significantly greater variation between projections and actual spend for budget 
lines that include OCO spending.
• Starting and ending budget lines significantly complicate modeling. Better unique 
identifiers and higher level analysis using public strategically relevant lexicons would aid 
analysis and debate.
• OCO adds flexibility to the FYDP, but its inherent uncertainty undermines its ability to 
communicate lasting priorities. Other mechanisms, like portfolio reserve funds, could 
help.
• Contact us for open access to the underlying unclassified FYDP dataset.
Regression Model
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Estimating Actual 2013-2014 and 2018-2019 Spending
2013 Base 2018 Base 2013 OCO 2018 OCO
(Intercept) 0.27* 0.44*** 0.10 0.32
(0.10) (0.09) (0.33) (0.27)
log(Cumulative Base + 1) 0.95*** 0.94***
(0.01) (0.01)
log(Cumulative Base + OCO + 1) 0.97*** 0.97***
(0.03) (0.02)
log(Actual_Total+1) 0.02** 0.02*** 0.01 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No FYDP2 Base -0.02 0.37*** 0.30· 0.60***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.17) (0.12)
Any Enacted OCO -0.06 0.15·
(0.12) (0.08)
Military Dept (compared to Navy)
Army -0.01 0.14*** -0.05 0.13
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08)
Air Force -0.08· 0.00 -0.03 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.09)
Other DoD 0.10* 0.08· 0.18 0.22·
(0.05) (0.04) (0.16) (0.12)
R2 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.86
Adj. R2 0.92 0.92 0.84 0.86
Num. obs. 997 1222 261 364
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; ·p < 0.1. 
